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resumo
Nas últimas quatro décadas, a República da Coreia (Coreia do Sul ou Co-
reia) transformou-se de um país pobre, com uma sociedade agrária dilacerada pela 
guerra, em uma nação industrial e moderna, líder em importantes áreas, como 
tecnologia da informação e inovação. Apesar do notável desempenho nacional, o 
papel da Coreia como ator regional e global era considerado pouco expressivo até 
os anos 1990. Com o fim da Guerra Fria e a consolidação de suas bases diplomá-
ticas, a política externa da Coreia passou por rápidas transformações; seu escopo 
tornou-se global e incluiu o que tem sido chamado “diplomacia de cúpula”, com 
o objetivo de fortalecer as relações já existentes e iniciar novas parcerias e projetos 
de cooperação para o século XXI. Em nível regional, a Coreia tornou-se membro 
ativo da Asean+3, da Apec e de outras organizações; desde 2008 mantém cúpulas 
trilaterais anuais com a China e com o Japão, e em setembro de 2011 Seul tornou-
se sede do Secretariado para a Cooperação Trilateral. Poucos anos após ingressar 
na ONU (1991), em novembro de 1995 o país foi eleito membro não permanente 
do Conselho de Segurança e recentemente foi novamente eleito para o período de 
2013-2014; em 2006 o diplomata coreano Ban Ki-moon foi eleito o 8o secretário-
geral da ONU, e em junho de 2011 teve seu mandato renovado até 2016. Estas e 
outras importantes conquistas evidenciam o papel assertivo da Coreia como ator 
regional e global. A fim de fortalecer a cooperação com parceiros já estabelecidos e 
com países emergentes, a Coreia propõe as seguintes políticas e estratégias: expan-
são do mercado exportador, atração de IED, consolidação do comércio bilateral e 
intensificação dos laços com os principais parceiros. Entretanto, além de seu ine-
gável sucesso econômico e conquistas políticas nos panoramas regional e global, 
variáveis externas desempenham importante papel na determinação da Coreia de 
ampliar seu papel de ator regional e global: as políticas domésticas e internacionais 
e as consequentes estratégias a serem desenvolvidas pela China, pelos EUA e pelo 
Japão, bem como as relações futuras entre esses três países. As relações entre os 
EUA e a China, em particular, irão determinar futuros acontecimentos no Leste 
Asiático. A China é hoje o maior parceiro comercial da Coreia, mas este país de-
pende dos EUA para sua segurança e apoio militar. Portanto, espera-se que o novo 
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governo coreano mantenha uma estratégia de pêndulo em suas relações com a 
China e com os EUA e, ao mesmo tempo, neutralidade no que se refere às relações 
entre Japão e China.
Palavras-chave: Coreia do Sul. Papel regional e internacional. Desafios e pers-
pectivas.
abstract
In the last four decades the Republic of Korea (South Korea or Korea) deve-
loped from a poor country and an agrarian society into a wealthy and industrial 
nation and a world leader in important areas such as information technology 
and innovation. Despite its remarkable achievements at the national level, at the 
regional and global levels Korea´s role was somewhat marginal until the 1990s. 
With the end of the Cold War and its diplomatic foundations established Korea´s 
foreign policy underwent rapid transformations; its scope became global and in-
cluded what has been called “summit diplomacy”, designed to consolidate frien-
dly relations and start new partnerships and projects of cooperation for the 21th 
century. At the regional level it is an active member of Asean+3, of Apec and of 
other organizations; since 2008 it maintains annual Trilateral Summit Meetings 
with China and Japan, and in September 2011 Seoul became seat of the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat. Only a few years after joining the UN (1991), in Novem-
ber 1995 the country was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC, and 
recently was again elected for the period of 2013-2014; in 2006 Ban Ki-moon, 
a Korean Diplomat, was elected the 8th Secretary General of the UN and in June 
2011 he had his mandate renewed until 2016. These and other important achie-
vements are evidence of Korea´s assertive role as a regional and global actor. To 
strengthen cooperation with established and emerging international partners the 
country will rely on the following policy directions and strategies: expand export 
markets, attract FDI, pursue bilateral trade and intensify ties with major trading 
partners. It is clear, however, that in addition to its undeniable economic success 
story and political achievements at the regional and international levels, external 
variables are quite important in Korea´s determination to expand its regional and 
global roles: the domestic and international policies and consequent strategies im-
plemented by China, the United States, and Japan, as well the future relationships 
among these three countries. The relationships between the US and China, in par-
ticular, will determine to a large extent what will happen in East Asia. China has 
become Korea´s number one trade partner, but Korea is heavily dependent on the 
US for security and military assistance. Therefore, the new Korean government is 
expected to play a kind of pendulum strategy between the two major powers, as 
well as a somewhat neutral role with respect to Sino-Japanese China relations.
Key words: South Korea. Regional and global roles. Challenges and perspectives.
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introduction
In the last four decades or so the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea 
or simply Korea) developed from a poor country and an agrarian society to 
a wealthy and industrialized nation and a world leader in areas such as infor-
mation technology, innovation, and others. Studies have shown that Korea´s 
success results mainly from government investments and incentives, especially 
in the chaebols – conglomerates controlled by family groups with strong ties 
to government agencies and official banks – in an export-oriented policy and 
on high priority in education. Along with its remarkable economic success, 
the country overcame a long military dictatorship and achieved political sta-
bility within a democratic framework. Despite its remarkable achievements 
at the national level, Korea´s role, both at the regional and global levels, was 
regarded as somewhat marginal until the 1990s when it began to gain further 
visibility and recognition as an international actor. This paper reviews briefly 
Korea´s political and economic features, and its policy directions and strate-
gies to boost its expanding role at the regional and global levels.
a brief political overview3
Although the Korean Nation’s history is long and rich, due to the Korean 
War (1950-1953) and the creation of two separate Korean states, the history 
of South Korea begins in 1948 with the establishment of the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) and the election of Syngman Rhee as the country’s first Presi-
dent, by its recently constituted National Assembly. Syngman Rhee remained 
president until April 1960, when he was forced to resign, under accusations of 
electoral fraud, corruption, dictatorship and other wrong doings.
The military regime
The succeeding government led by Yun Po-sun (1960-1962) was fra-
gile and faced difficulties in controlling popular discontent and demonstra-
tions, mostly due to economic uncertainty and unemployment. General Park 
Chung-hee took advantage of the situation, led a coup d’état, becoming the 
country´s strong man, and in 1963 was elected President of the Republic. 
Park established an innovative national plan with the purpose of transforming 
South Korea, historically a traditional and agrarian society, impoverished by 
the war, into a “rich country and a military power”. These goals would be 
achieved through a process of accelerated industrialization, investment in 
3 The sections “A Political Overview” and “Economic and Social Outlook” draws partially on 
GUIMARãES, Lytton L., South Korean Foreign and Security Policies: Some Implications for East Asia 
Integration and for Latin America, presented at the UCLA-CKS Conference on Joint Research Project 
II, May 5-6, 2011. The following sources were also used in writing these two parts of the paper: KIM 
(2003), SNYDER (2003) CHOI (2007).
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education, science and technology, and special emphasis on an export strategy. 
A large amount of financial resources were channeled to support the chaebols, 
some of which grew rapidly and played an important role in the government 
controlled development programs.
General Park was assassinated in October 1979. During almost two 
decades under his leadership (1963-1979), South Korea underwent a deep 
and encompassing transformation, with significantly high economic develo-
pment, resulting from investments in intra-structure, education, science and 
technology, and relatively abundant supply of cheap labor. Following Park´s 
assassination a process of political liberalization led by Choi Kyu-ha (1979-
1980) was interrupted by a new coup d´état led by General Chun Doo-hwan, 
who consolidated his position of power and remained president from 1980 
to 1988. Chun continued Park´s strategy of accelerated industrialization and 
economic growth, but now with special emphasis on high tech value added 
industries aiming at the external market. Chun´s successor was Roh Tae-woo, 
a former general and an important collaborator in Chun´s government. He 
promoted closer contacts with North Korea, a Constitutional reform gran-
ting more decision-making power to the National Assembly, popular vote in 
future presidential elections and broader political freedom. The three policy 
targets of his administration were defined as a pro-active diplomacy, political 
and socioeconomic growth with equality, and national reunification.
 
return to civilian rule 
In November 1992 Kim Young-sam, an opposition leader, was elected 
the first civilian president since 1960. He promised to build a “new Korea”, 
fight corruption and promote economic development. His anti-corruption 
campaign resulted in the arrest of the two former presidents – Chun Doo-
Hwan and Roh Tae-woo – accused of high treason, for their role in the 1979 
coup and a massacre in the city of Kwangju; Chun received the death penalty, 
later commuted to life in prison, while Roh was condemned to more than 22 
years in prison, later reduced to 17 years. However, in 1998 both were pardo-
ned by President Kim Dae-jung, their former political rival.
President Kim Young-sam developed a set of policies called “A New Five-
Year Plan for the New Economy”. But he faced serious economic problems 
which contributed to the Asian (and Korean) Crisis of 1997/1998. Although 
the country´s macroeconomic foundations were considered solid, banks faced 
an enormous volume of unpaid loans, especially from the part of chaebols, 
which were responsible for a large innovation and expansion programs desig-
ned to compete in the world market. The unusual volume of unpaid debts led 
to a series of bankruptcies and acquisitions (JWA, 2002).
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At the end of 1997, Kim Dae-jung was elected President of the ROK 
(1998-2003). His election marked what has been considered the first real de-
mocratic transition in South Korean history, as it involved the transfer of 
power by an incumbent civilian president, elected by popular vote, to another 
civilian president elected by opposing political forces. The new government 
was based on the President´s belief in the simultaneous processes of the de-
velopment of democratization and the transition to a market economy. His 
ambitious program involved what was called “Second Nation Building” for 
the 21st century and the “sunshine policy” towards North Korea.4 Although 
facing an unprecedented financial crisis President Kim Dae-jung went ahead 
with his program of reforms, created incentives for foreign investment, and 
began a revolution focused on individual rights and education. In recognition 
of his efforts and initiatives, he was awarded the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize.5 An 
important international event during his government was the Football World 
Cup that took place in 2002, in partnership with Japan.
Kim Dae-jung´s successor was President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), 
whose election brought to power a new generation of politicians, many of 
whom were veterans of the former student demonstrations held against the 
military governments. This new generation of leaders contributed to the pro-
cess of articulation and implementation of a progressive agenda in opposition 
to the regarded “backward politics” practiced until then. These and other as-
pects of the reforms, such as the enforcement of campaign finance laws un-
derlying the relations between business and politics, considered “roots of cor-
ruption”, were “one of Roh´s administration most important contributions” 
to the consolidation of democracy in Korea (CHAIBONG, 2008). 
Like President Kim Dae-jung, President Roh was considered an idealist 
and visionary. With a historical past as a defender of human rights and de-
cency in public office, he was seen as an anti-corruption president. But in spite 
of the positive expectations with his election, his term in office was considered 
tumultuous by both Korean and international observers. The business elite 
saw him as a leftist due to his efforts to redistribute wealth. Accused by mem-
4 Second nation building was defined as “a total reform of state affairs in order to overcome the present 
national crisis, to refurbish the groundwork of the nation, and finally enter the ranks of advanced 
countries, by a democratic market economy and internalizing the universal principles and values, on the 
basis of industrialization and democratization that have been achieved since the first nation-building 
of the foundation of the modern state in post war period”. The sunshine policy was a new strategy to 
promote “co-prosperity of both Koreas, thus putting an end to confrontation and conflict”. It would 
establish “new inter-Korean relations, for reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful existence”. “The 
Great Transformation and the Direction for Reform [in Korean],” Seoul: Presidential Commission for 
Policy Consultation, 1998: in The Society for Northeast Asian Peace Studies (KIM, 1998, p. 37-39).
5 The diploma he received contains the following inscription: “for his work for democracy and human 
rights in South Korea and in East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in 
particular”(NOBEL PRIZE ORGANIZATION, 2010).
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bers of the National Assembly of violating the Constitution he was impeached 
until the Constitutional Court reversed the decision.
Although international trade was favorable and the economy was expan-
ding, the country faced problems such as unemployment, lack of FDI, failure 
to improve the educational system, as promised during his campaign. From a 
political perspective, the President was accused of lack of flexibility, what may 
have contributed to his party´s decline in the National Assembly election; as 
a result he was unable to make his successor. One year after he left the Presi-
dency, he became the object of an investigation of a scandal involving suspi-
cion of corruption. On 23 May 2009 the former president was found dead, 
having left a suicide note.
Lee Myung-bak, a former Hyundai CEO and mayor of Seoul, was elec-
ted Roh´s successor. His election represented a shift from the ten years of 
liberal governments led by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, both more 
identified with the idealistic tradition, to a conservative and pragmatic appro-
ach, closer to the Realpolitik tradition. In economic terms, the main targets 
defined for his administration were summarized in “Plan 747”: to achieve 
seven percent annual GDP growth, reach a per capita income of US$40,000 
and raise the Korean economy to the seventh position among the world eco-
nomies.6 The President seemed to believe that he received a mandate to build 
a “new Korea”, with an affluent, healthy society, and a strong state. To reach 
such goals he would follow a strategy named “Smart Market Economy, Em-
pirical Pragmatism, and Democratic Activism”. However, the global financial 
crisis that began in the US in 2008 became a major obstacle to his ambitious 
economic targets.
The Lee Administration defined what was called “special policies” to fight 
the global financial and economic crisis, which included tax cuts and new tax 
deregulations, interest rate controls, and other specific measures to prevent the 
world crisis from causing serious damages to the domestic economy. As a re-
sult, Korean and international observers alike agree that Korea was one of the 
first countries to recover from the international financial crisis more rapidly 
than most OECD member states.
The President attempted to transform the world economic crisis into an 
opportunity to make Korea a “global soft power” able to mediate conflicts 
between rich and poor countries (WALSH, 2009; LEE, 2010). However, by 
the end of 2010, some of his close associates regarded as powerful members 
of the administration were accused of “involvement in improprieties”. The 
6 Whenever no specific source is mentioned, the following main sources were consulted in writing this 
section about President Lee´s Administration: “What are some of President Lee Myung-bak´s ma-
jor projects for improving Korea?” (www.koreabrand.net/htmil/en/forPrintKnow/html; accessed on 3 
March 2011) and Reuters, “PROFILE-South Korea´s President Lee Myung-bak” (www.reuters.com./
assets/print?aid=USLEADERKR20110223; accessed on 5 March 2011).
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opposition, and also some members of his party, raised the issue of abuse of 
power and corruption committed by senior government officials. At its final 
phase President Lee´s administration was criticized for the increase of unem-
ployment and income inequality, for the allegedly manipulation of statistics 
to make unemployment appear lower than what it really was, for the lack 
of price controls and the acceleration of inflation, for illegal surveillance of 
opposition leaders, and for corruption and malpractice among prosecutors. 
Another source of criticism was the fact that with less than a month to end his 
term in office, President Lee granted pardons to several of his political allies, 
some of which had been convicted of corruption and other crimes (CHOE, 
2013) Some Korea watchers have argued that he left his five-year term “gene-
rally high on international relations and economic crisis management but low 
on inter-Korean ties and domestic politics” (SONG, 2013).
President Park Geun-hye, Korea´s first female president, elected in De-
cember 2012 for the period of 2013-2018, was acting First Lady from 1974 
to 1979, when her father, former President Park, was killed. She was elected 
for the National Assembly in 1998 and since then reelected in every succee-
ding election. At the National Assembly she was a chairperson of important 
committees. In 2007 she sought the nomination as presidential candidate of 
the Grand National Party, when former President Lee Myung-bak was chosen 
the party candidate (http://english.president.go.kr/m).
President Park Geun-hye chose as her Administrative Philosophy “A pa-
radigm shift in the operation of economic and social affairs and governance to 
realize the full potential of the Republic of Korea through grand integration 
and sustainable development”. Her Administrative Vision and Goals are de-
fined as “A New Era of Hope”. During a cabinet meeting held on May 28, 
2013, the President reaffirmed that her government will pursue four Admi-
nistrative Priorities: 1) economic revival; 2) happiness for the people; 3) cul-
tural renaissance; and 4) laying the foundation for peaceful unification. These 
four administrative priorities will encompass 14 categories and a total of 140 
administrative tasks (http://english.president.go.kr/m). A poll to evaluate her 
first 100 days in office reported an approval rating of 65%, better than her 
predecessor´s in the same period (17.7%), although lower than Kim Young-
sam´s (82.4%) and Kim Kae-jung´s (77.1%). Results of the same poll show 
that some of her appointees for high level offices have been accused of invol-
vement in corruption schemes and therefore seem to have become a burden 
for her government (www.rjkoehler.com.2013).
Consolidation of democracy
Since the return to civilian rule five presidents have been elected by popu-
lar vote and at least in two cases by opposing political forces, an indication of 
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alternation of power and political maturity. The ROK political transition has 
been regarded as an example of the third wave of democratization, suggested 
by Huntington (1992). Its political parties are relatively young and have been 
subjected to being “refunded” or dissolved. But they have played an important 
role in elections for the Presidency and for the National Assembly. Korean 
analysts generally agree that the country has an independent judiciary system, 
a free press, and above all, an active and demanding civil society (LEE, 2009; 
SNYDER, 2003; KIM, 2003).
The Economist Intelligence Unit´s “Democracy Index 2012” ranks Ko-
rea in the 20th position, with an overall score of 8.13 out of a possible 10. A 
total of 167 countries were included in the index, composed of the following 
variables: 1) electoral process and pluralism; 2) functioning of government; 3) 
political participation; 4) political culture; and 5) civil liberties. Norway was 
ranked number 1, with an overall score of 9.93; the USA received 8.11 points 
and was classified in 21st place, just before Costa Rica with a score of 8.10; Ja-
pan comes next with an overall score of 8.08. China obtained 3.14 points and 
was ranked in the 142nd place. North Korea appeared in the last place (167th) 
with an overall score of 1.08 points (www.eiu.com). 
economic and social outlook
The “Miracle on the Hangang River”
The expression is used to refer to the accelerated economic growth which 
in about four decades transformed South Korea from a poor, agrarian and 
traditional society, into an industrialized, technologically advanced, urba-
nized and modern country, in which the majority of the population enjoys 
high living standards. This exceedingly rapid process of economic growth was 
accompanied by a globalization of the Korean economy and the worldwide 
presence of multinational firms such LG, Hyundai, Samsung and others. Ob-
servers attribute the use of the phrase to an analogy of “Miracle on the Rhine”, 
which described the economic growth of West Germany after World War II. 
Initially the phrase was used in reference to Seoul – through which the Han 
River flows – and its rapid transformation into an international business and 
commercial hub, but nowadays it is also used as a symbol of national pride 
for Koreans.
Table 1 (Annex) shows Korea´s GDP growth and per capita GNI for the 
period of 1970 to 2011. From 1970 to 2007 the Korean economy achieved 
a constant and relatively high growth rate, when its per capita income also 
rose steadily. The growth trend was interrupted with the world financial crisis 
of 2008, and to some extent picked up again in 2010. A report released by 
the Korean Development Institute (KDI) predicts that the Korean economy 
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will expand 2.6 percent in 2013 and 3.6 percent in 2014, depending on the 
gradual recovery of the global economy. Exports, equivalent to about half of 
the Korean economy, are expected to increase 6.4 percent in 2013, and 8.4 
percent in 2014. The rate of inflation is estimated at 1.8 percent in 2013 and 
2.6 percent next year (SOUTH KOREA, 2013).
New challenges
A recent study made available by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) 
(MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, April 2013) shows that South Korea 
has become a world leader in several industries: “Number 1 in DRAM me-
mory chips with 66 percent global market share; number 1 in LCD displays 
with 51 percent global market share (LCD panels); number 1 in mobile pho-
ne market share; number 1 in shipbuilding with 51 percent of global market 
share; number 5 in autos, with 4.7 million vehicles in 2011; number 5 in 
refinery capacity; number 6 in global steel production”. A challenge faced by 
Seoul is to preserve these remarkable achievements.
The same study conducted by the MGI presents also a detailed analysis 
of data showing that South Koreans faces other serious economic and social 
challenges, some of which are listed below: 
a shift in job creation, from manufacturing to services, with strong nega-•	
tive impact on incomes;
productivity gains and overseas expansion (by large companies) have me-•	
ant “jobless growth” at home; official employment records do not capture 
the full extent of joblessness; there is hidden unemployment;
the manufacturing sector leads in GDP growth, but services lead in job •	
creation, with lower wages; wage growth has not kept up with GDP gro-
wth; manufacturing has raised output by improving productivity and the 
services sector has grown by adding employees;
total savings have remained high enough to fund investment but hou-•	
sehold savings have declined;
middle-income families face the largest and fastest growing debt payment •	
and education fees;
house prices are high and South Koreans have more of their own resources •	
tied up in household than do people of other developed countries; and the 
share of middle-income households has declined;
the South Korean fertility rate has fallen by two-thirds since the 1970s, •	
so the country is already feeling the effects from slowing flow of prime 
working-age population into the labor force.
Along with her number one Administrative Priority – economic revival 
– and as if recalling her father´s role in setting up the basis for the “Miracle 
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on the Hangang River”, in her inauguration address President Park Geun-hye 
called on South Koreans to help her create conditions for a “Second Hangang 
River Miracle”. She ended her address with the following phrase: “Let us all 
work together towards a new era of happiness and hope, so that we can all 
become partners in another miracle or a new chapter in the “Miracle on the 
Han River” (http://www.english.yonhapnews.co.kr).
south Korea´s presence in the world arena
In search of cooperation and support
During its first decades the ROK´s government had to mobilize its socie-
ty to achieve economic growth and to undertake national efforts to maintain 
security and survival, since it faced a constant threat from North Korea. The 
ROK had to strengthen diplomatic ties with many countries in order to secure 
cooperation and support, particularly from the US, under the South Korea-
United States Defense agreements, and in compensation for South Korea´s 
involvement in the Vietnam War; the country depended also on aid provided 
by Japan as part of the Treaty of Basic Relations between the two countries. 
Consolidation of the country´s presence in the international arena was a rela-
tively slow process, but by the end of the 1980s South Korea had established 
diplomatic relations with most countries in all continents.
The success of the Seoul Olympics of 1988 as well as the world cup of 
2002, in partnership with Japan, helped to project a positive image of the 
country in the world. In 1988 Korea launched a foreign policy initiative to-
wards Eastern Europe, called Nordpolitik, which represented a major break in 
Korea´s diplomatic orientation and was undertaken with the expectation that 
formal relations with other socialist countries might induce North Korea to 
accept peaceful coexistence with the ROK. As part of this strategy, President 
Roh met with President Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco in June 1990. 
The summit ended more than four decades of absence of formal ties between 
the two countries and opened the way to future bilateral cooperation. By 
1992 Korea had established diplomatic relations with most of the former so-
cialist countries, as well as with China.
Summit diplomacy
With its diplomatic foundation established South Korea pursued what 
MOFAT has called “summit diplomacy”, designed to consolidate friendly re-
lations and start new partnerships and projects of cooperation for the 21st 
century. Following this new trend President Kim Young-sam met with several 
world leaders; leading a group of high level government officials and business-
men he visited five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guate-
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mala, and Peru. It was the first visit by a Korean president to a group of Latin 
American countries. Agreements were concluded, opening new opportunities 
for investment, trade, and cooperation.
In a Sydney Declaration of November 1994 President Kim Young-sam 
announced his administration drive to globalization and set up the “Globali-
zation Promotion Committee”, headed by the Prime Minister. The President 
argued that Korea had been so far successful in its efforts to become a mo-
dern and industrialized nation, but needed now to face new challenges of the 
process of globalization. Therefore, his proposed policy (called segyehwa) was 
necessary. His main motivation was to increase Korea´s competitive edge in a 
globalized world, and to motivate businesses´ expansion to gain new markets 
and reduce production costs (SHIN, 2003).
President Kim Dae-jung also held summits with world leaders to pro-
mote Korean interests and his “sunshine policy”. One of the most important 
events of his Administration was the summit held in Pyongyang during 13-15 
June 2000 with Chairman Kim Jong-il. In addition to establishing a promi-
sing political relationship – which did not last long, due mainly to outside 
factors7 –  the sunshine policy contributed to increasing the volume of trade 
between both Koreas as well as South Korea´s investment in North Korea.
President Roh Moo-hyun continued to give priority to the economic and 
trade diplomatic strategy aiming at reinforcing the process of building an “ad-
vanced trading nation”. In order to guarantee a regular supply of energy to his 
country, he held summits with leaders of most oil and gas-producing coun-
tries; on his way to Russia and Central Asia in September 2004 he used for 
the first time the expression “resource diplomacy” to refer to Korea´s energy 
security, and the need to diversify its sources of oil in view political instability 
in the Middle East and rising prices of petroleum. The expression “resource 
diplomacy” was later used as a strategy in connection also with other sour-
ces of energy as well to food security and became part of Korea´s relations 
with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and other regions (KALINOWSKI; 
CHOI, 2012). At the same time the government implemented policies desig-
ned to develop new technologies to produce alternative sources of clean energy 
(SOUTH KOREA, MOFAT, White Papers 2006). The President continued 
to pursue engagement with North Korea and visited Pyongyang (2-4 October 
2007) for a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-il. The two leaders signed an 
agreement which anticipated closer cooperation in several areas. 
7 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000 as President Bill Clinton’s 
demonstration of approval regarding President Kim´s strategy towards North Korea. However, Bush´s 
State of the Union Message 2002, in which he qualified North Korea, together with Iraq and Iran, as 
the “axis of evil”, contributed to deepen differences between Kim and Bush, and to create difficulties 
for US-South Korea relations as well for relation between both Koreas (KIRK, 2009).
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President Lee Myung-bak pursued intensively the summit diplomacy 
strategy. During the first year of his Administration (2008) he held 13 sum-
mit meetings with heads of states and governments of Korea´s main partners 
such as the USA, China, Japan, and also with leaders of Peru, Poland, Jordan, 
Denmark, Russia and Vietnam. In the course of the following years he held 
even more summits with leaders of other countries and of international orga-
nizations, such as the UN, Asean, Apec, the European Union, and others: 44 
in 2009, 69 in 2010, 36 in 2011, and 62 in 2012. Those summit meetings 
have been considered valid tools by the Korean government to consolidate 
existing partnerships and/or to open up new markets and new avenues for 
trade and cooperation, and in many cases to guarantee energy and food supply 
to South Korea.8
The ROK as a regional actor 
In July 1989 South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (Asean) established a dialogue, which until then had been restricted to 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the USA. This dialogue was most 
important as it promoted not only closer contacts with Asean and its indivi-
dual country members, especially after the agreement that instituted Asean+3 
(Korea, Japan and China), but it also became a vehicle for Korea´s approxi-
mation with Japan and China. At the end of 1999 President Kim Dae-jung, 
China´s Premier Zhu Rongji, and Japan´s Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi met 
in Manila, on the sideline of the annual Asean meeting; that ad hoc meeting 
was the first of a series of eight annual meetings held among the leaders of 
South Korea, China, and Japan, on the sideline of the Asean summits, before 
the Trilateral Summit meetings became a regular event on the diplomatic and 
economic agendas of the three countries.9 
A “Future-Oriented Mature Partnership” with Japan and a “Strategic Co-
operative Partnership” with China, proposed by President Lee Myung-bak 
during his visits to those countries in his first year in office, received further 
support during the ad hoc Trilateral Summit meeting among the leaders of the 
three countries held on December 13 2008, at the Japanese city of Fukuoka. 
This was the first Trilateral Summit meeting held independently of the mul-
tilateral summits held by Asean+3. A “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partner-
ship” released at the end of the summit points out the interdependence of the 
three economies, the strong people-to-people cultural ties, and the desire to 
8 Data on the number of summit meetings held by President Lee were obtained from various sources 
(www.mofat.go,kr, www.english/president.go.kr, and others).
9 A visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by the Japanese PM Junichiro Koizume, despite official protests by South 
Korea and China, led to a sine die postponement of a Korea-China-Japan meeting scheduled to be held 
on the sidelines of the Asean+3 meeting in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 (South Korea, Mofat 
White Paper 2006).
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work towards the creation of a “peaceful, prosperous and sustainable future 
for the region and the international community”. In recognition of the im-
portance and success of this first high level meeting, the three leaders decided 
to hold annually Tripartite Summit Meetings (JAPAN, Dec. 2008).
Since then heads of state and governments of the three countries have 
met in annual summits, when they have repeatedly expressed their determina-
tion to enhance cooperation in several areas, despite bilateral issues that still 
exist and may not be resolved in the foreseeable future.10 Following a pro-
posal by President Lee, approved by his Japanese and Chinese counterparts, 
in September 2011 a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat opened in Seoul. The 
“Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Partner-
ship”, signed on the occasion of the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting (13 May 
2012) is the institutional basis for the Secretariat. It will promote three-way 
cooperation through joint projects. The three countries will rotate in naming 
Secretary Generals for the office. South Korean ambassador Shin Bong-kil was 
appointed the first Secretary General for the first two-year term (www.tsc-asia.
org/dnb/main).
The ROK as a global actor
South Korea is a founding member of Apec (1989), in 1991 it was admit-
ted to the UN (together with North Korea), and in 1996 became a member 
of OECD. The country gained further visibility and recognition as a global 
actor by joining the G20 in 2008. The 2010 G20 Summit held in Seoul on 
November 11-12, the fifth G20 summit where heads of 19 states and gover-
nments and European Union representatives discussed the global financial 
system and the world economy, “symbolized the membership of South Korea 
in the ranks of rich economies and has provided the opportunity to highlight 
South Korea as a successful development story from an aid recipient to an aid 
donor” (CHUNG, 2012, www.nacsi.or.kr). Another important international 
event hosted by Korea was the Nuclear Security Summit, held in March 27, 
2012; at the end of the summit the “Seoul Communiqué at 2012 Nuclear 
Security Summit” was released in a joint declaration of leaders at the summit 
(www.cfr.org/proliferation).
Throughout the 1990s, the UN Security Council reform remained an 
important issue on the multilateral agenda, as well as other items like the need 
to strengthen the role of the UN in peace keeping operations and internatio-
nal security and its ability to enforce human rights. Korea had an active role in 
10 With respect to unresolved bilateral issues, the Chinese government requested to Korean President Park 
to postpone the summit meeting scheduled for May 2013, on the ground of recent diplomatic difficul-
ties with Japan relating to the control of Senkaku islands, named by Japan, and Diaoyu, according to 
China.
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these important UN initiatives as well in those related to multilateral security 
cooperation in East Asia, with the adoption of a September 2005 Joint State-
ment at the Six-Party Talks. In addition, Korea contributed to the success of 
regional cooperation promoted by Apec, Asean+3, and Asean Regional Forum 
(ARF), as well to the first East Asia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in Decem-
ber 2005 which brought a new perspective to multilateral diplomacy to the 
region (http://www.aseansec.org/aadcp/repsf/abouteastasiasummit;html).
With the end of the Cold War South Korean foreign policy underwent 
rapid political, economic, and cultural transformations; its scope became glo-
bal and included expanded trade and economic relations with most coun-
tries. Only two years after joining the United Nations Korea was contributing 
effectively to UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Angola (1993); in 
November 1995 the country was elected for the first time to occupy a non-
permanent seat of the UN Security Council. In the following years Korea con-
tinued to contribute with troops to UN peacekeeping operations, including 
the UN East Timor mission. In October 2006 Ban Ki-moon, a diplomat and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was elected the 8th Secretary General of the 
United Nations. In June 2011 he was elected for a second term which will end 
in 2016. After 15 years South Korea succeeded in being elected for a second 
time as a non-permanent member to the UN Security Council for the period 
2013-2014. These and other initiatives are evidence of Korea´s assertive role 
as a global actor.
Policy directions and strategies
On the basis of the argument that Korea is a nation of trade, its Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy (Motie), intends to “strengthen cooperation 
with established and emerging international partners to deepen existing bon-
ds and discover untapped opportunities”. To achieve these goals it relies on 
“Four Policy Directions”: 1) Expand Export Markets; 2) Attract Foreign Di-
rect Investment (FDI); 3) Pursue Bilateral Trade Agreements; and 4) Intensify 
Ties of Major Trading Partners. The strategies to intensify ties with major 
trading partners and to expand economic partnerships to emerging markets 
are summarized in Table 2 (Annex). The major trading partners are defined as 
the USA, the European Union, China and Asia, while the Middle East, Rus-
sia/CIS, Central and South America, parts of Asia, and Africa are considered 
Emerging Markets (http://www.motie.go.kr).
Since the establishment of a FTA Roadmap in 2003, all Korean gover-
nments have concluded and/or are in various stages of the process of nego-
tiating FTAs with several countries, as shown in Table 3 (Annex). The table 
exhibits also import/export data for 2011 of Korea´s trade partners; its six 
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most important trade partners, in terms of volume of trade in US dollars, are: 
1) China showing over 220 billion; 2) Asean with almost 125 billion; 3) the 
Golf Cooperation Countries (GCC) close to 113 billion; 4) Japan almost 108 
billion; 5) the European Union over 103 billion; and 6) the USA close to 101 
billion.
The first FTA was signed with Chile in 2004. In 2006 Free Trade Agre-
ements were signed with Singapore and EFTA, the following year Korea sig-
ned a FTA on goods with Asean, and in 2008 a similar agreement was con-
cluded with Turkey. The two most recent agreements were concluded with 
Peru (8/2011) and the USA (3/2012). Several other agreements are under 
negotiation. It is interesting to observe that Korea has pursued FTAs not only 
with its most important trade partners, but also with countries with which it 
maintains a relatively small volume of trade, such as Mongolia. As one of its 
“policy directions”, the Free Trade Agreements have been used by the Korean 
Government as a strategy to accomplish its objectives as a trading nation, and 
as a tool to open new markets and to reduce barriers. However, some critics 
have pointed out that FTAs alone do not motivate companies to seek new 
exports (MOFAT, 2012).
conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to examine and analyze South 
Korea´s expanding regional and global roles, in view of its remarkable eco-
nomic success story at the national level. Yet the country played a somewhat 
marginal role at the regional and global levels at least until the middle of the 
1990s. As pointed out, in about four decades South Korea underwent a trans-
formation from a poor, agrarian and traditional society, impoverished by the 
war, into an industrialized, technologically advanced, urbanized and modern 
country, in which the majority of the population enjoys high living standards. 
This process of economic growth is referred to by Koreans as the “Miracle on 
the Hangang River”.
Historical records show that due to its geopolitical location Korea was 
in the past the object and victim of great power rivalry and maneuvers, with 
the result that it was under Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. Thus 
one can understand that the country leaders have become uneasy for being 
squeezed in between the second and the third world economies, China and 
Japan, respectively, and therefore their efforts to turn the country´s economic 
success story into a political asset both at the regional and global levels. It se-
ems clear, however, that in addition to its undeniable economic success story, 
external factors play an important role in Korea´s determination to become 
a stronger regional and global player: the domestic and international poli-
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tics and the consequent strategies implemented by Japan, China, the United 
States, and of course the present and future relationships among them. The 
relationships between the US and China, in particular, to a large extent may 
determine what will happen in East Asia and in the Korean Peninsula. Despite 
their major differences, the US and China have become mutually dependent 
and have strengthened cooperation in several areas, especially in the context 
of multilateral organizations. As data have shown, China has become Korea´s 
number one trade partner, while the US is now only the 6th Korean trade part-
ner. On the other hand, Korea is heavily dependent on the US for security and 
military assistance. Therefore, a general expectation is that the new Korean 
government will continue playing a kind of pendulum strategy between the 
two major powers.
In addition, President Park is generally expected to follow a more mo-
derate and more flexible stance towards North Korea than former President 
Lee. She has also defended a more balanced foreign policy, although insisting 
on the importance of the US-South Korea Alliance; but at the same time 
she appears inclined to deepen and strengthen relations with China, and this 
was demonstrated when she sent a first special envoy to China, while all her 
predecessors sent their first special envoy to the US. North Korea´s provoca-
tions, recent nuclear test and rocket launch represent additional difficulties 
for President Park, and may provide arguments for South Korean nationalists 
and hardliners to try to influence her policies toward North Korea. The Japa-
nese Prime Minister Abe is also apparently using North Korea´s provocations 
to justify his nationalistic tones and arguments to try to convince President 
Barak Obama to strengthen and deepen the US-Japan alliance. Despite its 
undeniable economic and political achievements, South Korea is not strong 
enough to maintain an expanding and eventually a relatively dominant role 
in the region neither on a global basis. The situation is complex and requires 
Seoul diplomatic ability, and as opposed to President Lee who often took sides 
in favor of the US and Japan, the new government seems inclined to follow a 
neutral or at least a more balanced policy with respect to US-China rivalry as 
well as with respect to China-Japan unresolved issues.
It was clearly demonstrated that since the middle of the 1990s, and 
thanks to the implementation of its summit and resource diplomacies, and 
more recently new policy directions and strategies, and specially due to the 
determination of its leaders, South Korea has gained important political po-
sitions in the world; such gains have contributed significantly to enhance its 
global and regional roles. However, additional studies focusing on new and 
diverse aspects that were not possible in the present paper will certainly bring 
new findings and may shed new light on the subject. 
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annex
Table 1. South Korea´s GDP Growth and Per Capita GNI 
For the period 1970-1911
Year GDP Growth(US$ billion)
Per Capita GNI
(US$)
1970 8 254
1980 64 1,645
1990 264 6,147
2000 512 10,841
2007 1,049 21,650
2008 931 19,231
2009 834 17,175
2010 1,014 20,755
2011 1,116 22,489
Source: Table organized by the author based on data available at the Website of the Bank of 
Korea (www.eng.bok.or.kr, retrieved on July 10, 2013)
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Table 2. South Korea´s Strategies to Intensify Areas for Cooperation with 
Major Trading Partners and Expand Economic Partnership to Emerging 
Markets
Countries and 
regions 
Strategies/areas for Cooperation and to expand partnership
USA
Establish an Industrial Cooperation Committee. Expand 
cooperation in industry and technology. Identify and address 
obstacles for trade.
European 
Union
Promote Industrial and Technical Cooperation Committee 
activities with individual member countries. Provide support 
programs to better enable companies to benefit from the pro-
posed Korea-EU FTA.
China
Support local companies in enhancing competitiveness for the 
Chinese market. Expand channels for bilateral cooperation. As-
sist Korean firms with obstacles they encounter in the Chinese 
market.
Asia
Hold an IR (Investor Relations) meeting in Japan. Increase 
transnational cooperation between parts and materials compa-
nies.
The Middle 
East Attract Investment; Explore new markets. Export plants.
Russia/CIS Develop energy resources. Explore new markets.
Central and 
South Ame-
rica
Develop energy resources. Explore new markets. 
Asia Explore new markets. Pursue industrial cooperation. Reduce costs.
Africa Develop energy resources. Pursue industrial cooperation.
Source: Table organized by the author on the basis of information available at the website 
of the Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (www.motie.go.kr, retrieved on June 
2013)
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Table 3. South Korea Export, Import data, and the state of FTA initiati-
ves between South Korea and individual countries as listed, plus Central 
America, Mercosur, European Union, EFTA, GCC, and Asean (*) 
Countries Export 2011 (US$ bn) 
Import 2011 
(US$ bn)
State of  Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) 
USA 56.207 44.569 Implemented 03/2012
Canada 4.927 6.611 13th  round of  negot. 03/2008
Chile 2.381 4.857 Implemented 04/2004
Colombia 1.613 380 Negotiations Initiated 03/2012
Mexico 9.729 2.315 2nd round of  negotiation 6/2008
Peru 1.367 1.750 Implemented 08/2011
Mercosur 13.319 7.518 Joint study concluded 05/2011
Central Amer. 4.696 985 Joint study concluded 05/2011
E. Union 55.726 47.423 Provisionally implemented 07/2011
EFTA 1.817 5.177 Implemented 09/2006
GCC 17.270 95.459 3rd round of  negotiations
Israel 1.817 683 Feasibility study concluded 08/2010
Turkey 5.070 804 FTA on goods signed 08/2008
China 134.185 86.432 Negotiations launched 05/2012
India 12.654 7.893 CEPA Implemented 01/2010 (**)
Indonesia 13564 17.216 Negotiations launched 07/2012
Japan 39.679 68.320 2nd round of  consultation 05/2011
Malaysia 6.275 10.467 Agreed to conduct jt. Study 05/2011
Mongolia 349 60 Agreed to conduct jt. Study 10/2008 
Singapore 20.839 8.966 Implemented 03/2006
Vietnam 13.464 5.084 Negotiations launched 09/2012
Asean 71.801 53.120
FTA on goods implemented 06/2007 
FTA on services implem. 05/2009 
FTA on investment implem. 09/2009
Australia 8.163 26.316 5th round of  negotiations 05/2010
New Zealand 1.103 1.474 4th round of  negotiations 05/2010
Source: Table constructed by the author on the basis of information available at the website of 
the South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. Trade: Opening new opportunities 
(http://www.motie.go.kr).
Notes: (*) EFTA = European Free Trade Association; GCC = Gulf countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates); (**) Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement.
